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Article 5

LABOR LAW - UNION SECURITY THE AGENCY SHOP AND STATE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
Although the controversy that accompanies any mention of right-to-work legislation usually concerns itself with ideological and moral considerations, these
considerations do little to solve the practical problems that exist in those states
that have committed themselves to a right-to-work policy. These states,
with the possible exception of Indiana, are not heavily industrialized, and
thus some of the problems raised by this kind of legislation may be more truly problems of the future than of the present. Whether this legislative commitment is
actually motivated by democratic principles or is rather a thinly-disguised enticement to industry and its attendant economic stimuli is a question beyond the intended scope of this Note. But, regardless of the motivation, the status of the
collective bargaining agreement - what types of agreements are permissible and
what are prohibited by this legislation - is largely undetermined.
The principle pressed upon legislators, both national and local, a quarter of a
century ago was that employees had a right to belong to unions; a different proposition, that employees have a right not to belong to such organizations, is being
urged today. This shift in policy, or perhaps rather in perspective, is noticeable on
both a national and a local level, but it is in those states that have made it illegal
to compel union membership as a condition of employment that the collective bargaining agreement is most immediately affected.
Whereas unions could formerly insure the continuity of complete membership
and financial support for their bargaining activities by insisting upon a union security provision in the collective bargaining agreement, they are now prohibited under
right-to-work legislation from either effecting or demanding these provisions. This
situation results in a double burden. The union must now not only retain its existing membership, but it must also organize continuously. And, secondly, it must
represent under law, as the majority representative, even those who refuse to lend
the organization their moral or financial support. The organizing problem appears
to be one that the unions will simply have to live with. But as a means of combatting the "free rider" problem -the employee who derives the benefits of representation but refuses to pay for them -unions are attempting to write into their
agreements with employers a provision making employment contingent upon the
payment of the cost of representation. This, the agency shop, is a somewhat ignominious solution - ignominious because, whereas only thirty years ago unions
demanded the right to represent all the employees in the bargaining unit,
today they insist upon a right to the financial support of all those so represented,
whether or not they are at the same time members of the union.
The purpose of this Note, however, will not be to examine the merits or disadvantages of agency shop arrangements. Rather, it will attempt to explore simply
the question of whether or not states can, with right-to-work legislation of any type,
prohibit the execution or enforcement of these arrangements.
Background of the Problem
When Congress met in 1947 to thrash out a change in the national labor
policies, one of the most pressing problems to be resolved was the degree and the
form of union security which sound national policy should allow. The Wagner
Act had permitted all types of union security agreements- closed shop, union
shop, maintenance of membership, preferential hiring - but twelve years of experience under this Act had suggested unavoidable changes. Allegations and denials
of unscrupulous union power and the derogation of individual rights are numerous in the debates and in the reports,' and the Labor Management Relations Act2
is largely a corrective response to situations and practices that had been nurtured by
the previous policy.
1
2

See, e.g., 93 CoNG. REc. 4885-90 (1947).
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29

U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (1952).
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Congress realized, however, the value-in terms of stabilizing the collective
bargaining process-of some form of union security.3 In an effort to retain its
advantageous aspects, and at the same time provide the safeguards and changes
deemed necessary, Congress framed Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2). 4 Section
8(a) (3) provides that the union shop, in which all employees in the bargaining
unit must join the union within 30 days after employment or be subject to discharge,
is to be the most restrictive legitimate form of union security. The proviso to this section adds, however, that even under this form an employer may not discharge an
employee for reasons other than a failure to pay regular dues and initiation fees,
and makes a violation of this provision an unfair labor practice. Section 8(b) (2)
makes it illegal for a union to cause or attempt to cause an employer to violate
Section 8(a) (3).
It is made clear in the debates and in the committee reports that Congress
intended that the Act prohibit all forms of union security not in strict accordance
with the provisions of 8(a) (3), and that employment could be conditioned only
upon the payment of dues and initiation fees.5 Senator Taft himself said
The bill provides that if the man is admitted to the union, and subse-

quently is fired from the union for any reason other than the non-payment
of dues, then the employer shall not be required to fire that man.6
He also stated that, under the bill as he envisioned it,
The union could refuse the man admission to the union, or expel him from
the union and pay the same dues as the other members of the union, he
could not be fired from his job because the union refused to take him.7
It should be emphasized here that even though Congress would not sanction
membership in the union as a requisite of employment under such an agreement,
nevertheless the payment of dues was made necessary, because "[t]hat in effect, is
a kind of a tax, if you please, for union support, if the union is the recognized bargaining agent for all the men." 8 The distinction between membership and payment
is thus clear and inescapable, at least insofar as the co-sponsor of the Act viewed
the union security agreement.
That Congress had intended to so distinguish membership and the payment
of the costs of representation was early recognized by both the courts and the
National Labor Relations Board. In Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 9
where two employees were fired because they had not joined the union, both the
Board and the Court agreed that there had been a violation of the Act. Both individuals had tendered initiation fees and dues, but on religious grounds had
refused to take the oath of allegiance to the union. The union thereupon refused
to admit them, and demanded that the employer discharge them in accordance
with the contract, containing a union security clause. The Court held that the
legislative history of the Act clearly indicated that, while the union may have the
right to prescribe its own conditions of membership, it could not compel the discharge of employees who were willing to pay the dues and fees but were unwilling
to comply with the other requisites of membership. The Board, also, has held
strictly to the language of Section 8(a) (3), and has refused to include within the
11
cover of that section general assessments, 10 fines,
or even back dues incurred
12
before the execution of a union security contract.
3
4

CONG. REc. 4885 (1947)
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

See 93

U.S.C. § 158(2) (3) ; 158(b) (2) (1952).

(remarks of Senator Taft).
ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, (1947),
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5 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947); S.REP. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947).
6 CONG. Fc. 3837 (1947).

7

Rc.4272 (1947).

CONG.

8 93 CONG. REc.4887 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
9 108 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
10 International Harvester Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 730 (1953).
11 Pen and Pencil Workers Union, 91 N.L.R.B. 883 (1950).
12 N.L.R.B. v. UAW, 194 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1952).
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Thus this distinction between membership and payments has commended itself
both to the Board and to courts enforcing Board orders, and was justified in the
Union Starch case, where the Court said
We agree that the Union had the right, under the statute here involved,
to prescribe nondiscriminatory terms and conditions for acquiring membership in the Union, but we are unable to agree that it may adopt a rule that
requires the discharge of an employee for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees. We think the
Board construed the statute in a reasonable manner and gave effect to all its
provisions, and that its interpretation was in harmony with the purpose of
Congress to prevent utilization of union security agreements except to compel
13
payments of dues and initiation fees ....

In meeting the problem of union security, however, Congress did not confine
its consideration solely to federal policy. Section 14(b) was included expressly to
negate the impression that federal policy in this area was to be exclusive, and the
states were given the explicit authority to establish their own restrictions. This
section provides that
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a consuch execution or
dition of employment in any State or Territory in which
1 4
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.

A reading of the legislative history of this section of the Act indicates that
Congress was influenced by arguments which struck at the morality of compelling
membership in any organization as a condition of employment, 5 but it should be
noted that there is no suggestion in the debates or the records that the term membership, not qualified by a proviso as it was in § 8(a) (3), was intended to have any
meaning different from literal union membership. 6
The Supreme Court has had several occasions to consider the validity of state
7
legislation of the type authorized by 14(b). In the first case to reach the Court
right-to-work legislation was upheld against arguments grounded in the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Black wrote for the majority that in so doing
the Court was returning "closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle
that states have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not
run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal
law."18 In Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd.,' 9 the Court held that where the state law required approval by two-thirds of
affected employees for a valid union security contract, an employee who had refused to pay dues could not be discharged pursuant to the provisions of the
contract involved because this contract had not been approved in the requisite
manner. And in Plumbers Union v. Graham20 the Court upheld the power of
Virginia to enjoin picketing for a purpose in conflict with the state's right-to-work
law. That case concerned a "local" dispute, however, and was decided on the
13 186 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 815 (1951).
14 LAoBR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
15 See, e.g., H.R. Rap. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947); H.R. R P. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
16 But see, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 1, 1960, for interview with Mr. Hartley, c6-sponsor of
the Act, relative to the legality of the agency shop:
The intention of Congress in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act was to completely outlaw the closed shop, but to permit other forms of union security
agreement only where they were permissible under state law. Fred A. Hartley Jr. stated he was "utterly astonished" by interpretations that states have
no power under 14(b) to ban agency shops.
17 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
18 Id. at 536.
19 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
20 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
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grounds that such legislation was not an abridgement of the free speech provision
of the First Amendment, over dissents by Justices Black and Douglas.
Where the question presented to the Court has been one of conflict with
federal law, the seemingly broad interpretations suggested by the Algoma and
Graham cases have been severely constricted. In Teamsters Union v. Kerrigan Iron
Works, Inc., 21 the Court of Appeals of Tennessee had affirmed an injunction compelling a common carrier to continue rendering service to a customer whose
employees were picketing. The state court had held that the right of a union to
refuse to cross a picket line was not beyond the reach of a state court where such
activity was being conducted for a purpose contrary to state law imposing the duty
on carriers to render service to the public without discrimination. On certiorari,
the Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed, citing two cases22 which hold that
where the National Labor Relations Board has potential jurisdiction over a dispute the states are pre-empted from asserting their own jurisdiction. And in
another case appealed from Tennessee, the Court held, again per curiam, that the
state could not enjoin peaceful picketing affecting commerce when the purpose of
the picketing was contrary to the state's right-to-work law.23
Several State courts, nevertheless, have followed the Graham case, and have
affirmed orders enjoining union activity in contravention of express state legislation. 24 These decisions seem sound, however, only where the
disputes concerned
25
were not potentially subject to the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B.
The Agency Shop
The agency shop agreement is written into the collective bargaining contract
in much the same manner as a union shop provision, and requires, in its simplest
form, that employees in the unit represented by the union pay the same fees as
are demanded of union members.2 6 The check-off is not used, however, probably
because of the constitutional problems that would be involved. Employees are
required, rather, to pay their share of the costs of collective bargaining directly to
the union, and upon failure to do so, the employer is obliged under the contract to
discharge them on demand of the union. Employment is contingent, then, not
upon membership but rather upon payment of the costs of representation.
Agreements of this nature were first approved in the decisions of the War
Labor Board,2 7 but it was not until the decision of a Canadian judge in an arbitration award that the arrangement achieved real notice.2 8 In this opinion, Justice
I. C. Rand of the Canadian Supreme Court said that he could not, in the circumstances of the case, award a union shop in a dispute between the United Automobile Workers and the Ford Motor Company of Windsor, Canada, because "it
21 353 U.S. 968 (1957).
22 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); General Drivers Union v. American Tobacco Co., 348 U.S. 978 (1955). Weber indicates the area of pre-emption to include
rights protected by federal legislation, actions declared to be unfair labor practices and problems centering around certification by the Board, thus effectively distinguishing Algoma, which
permitted the state to grant remedies in disputes affecting commerce where the acts complained
of were neither sanctioned nor forbidden under federal law.
23 Local 420, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353
U.S. 969 (1957), citing Weber and Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). Garner

held that state was precluded from exercising equity powers to remedy an unfair labor practice
within the jurisdiction of the Board.
24 See, e.g., Minor v. Building Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956); Building

Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 P.2d 205 (1955). J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Local
755, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).

25 See, e.g., Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 18k Kan. 775, 317
P.2d 349 (1957). Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Local 379, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
247 N.C. 620, 101 S.E.2d 800 (1958).

26 For an example of a typical agency shop clause, see Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 159

N.E.2d 408, 409-10 (Ind.App. 1959).
27 See, e.g., 12 WAR LABOR BOARD REPORTS 510; 21 WAR LABOR BOARD REPORTS 219.

28 In re Ford Motor Co. of Canada and UAW, 1 L.A. 439, 17 L.R.R.M. 2782 (1946).
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would deny the individual Canadian the right to such work and to work independently of personal association with any organized group." 29 He went on to
add, however, that
I consider it entirely equitable then that all employees should be required to
shoulder their portion of the burden of expense for administering the law of
their employment, the union contract; that they must take the burden along
with the benefit.30

This decision, or, more realistically, this concept of union security, was widely
noted, and Senator Taft indicated that Congress was well aware of such a plan
when he said in debate that Section 8(a) (3) was intended to reach a result similar
to that reached under the "Canadian" rule."'
The National Labor Relations Board has passed on the validity of the agency
shop under the provisions of Section 8 (a) (3), and held that
because the legislative history of the amended Act indicates that Congress
intended not to illegalize the practice of obtaining support payments from
non-union members who would othewise be "free riders," we find that the
provision for support payments in the instant contract
does not exceed the
2
union security agreements authorized by the Act.

The federal courts have yet to rule upon the question.
In those states with right-to-work legislation, 3 the question of the validity of
an agency shop has risen in only two instances, and in both decisions the courts
found other grounds upon which to decide the case. The Supreme Court of Arizona held34 that where a union struck a restaurant and picketed to compel acceptance of a contract containing, among other things, both a "one-owner" clause35
and an agency shop provision, that such activity by the union violated the state
law. The decision rested on the invalidity of the "one-owner" clause; the court
expressly refused to pass on the legality of the agency shop.
In Indiana, the Appellate Court has affirmed the holding of a lower court
that union picketing for the purpose of compelling acceptance of a contract including a support payment clause could not be enjoined as a violation of that state's
right-to-work law.36 The court, stressing the penal nature of the statute, felt
bound to a strict interpretation of the wording which would permit such agreements in the absence of an express prohibition. Because several other states had
enacted right-to-work legislation when Indiana framed its own law, and because
37
in many of those states compulsory payment agreements are expressly prohibited
the court reasoned that the legislators could not be said to have intended such a
prohibition by implication and held therefore, that the purpose of the picketing
did not violate the statute. No other instances where a right-to-work state has con29 Id. at 1 L.A. 444.

30 Id. at 1 L.A. 445.
31

93 CONG. REc. 4887 (1947).

32 American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800, 802 (1952); see also In re Public Service Co.,
89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).
33 ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 375 (Supp. 1955); Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1302 (1956);
Ary. STAT. ANN. § 81-202 (1960); FLA. CONST. DEAL. OF RTs. § 12 (Supp. 1959); GA.

54-902 (Supp. 1958); IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-2703 (Supp. 1959); IowA CODE
(1950); KAN. CONST. art. 15 § 12 (1958), cited in 4 LAE. L. REP., Kan. para.
41,025 (1958); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1958); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1952);
NEv. Rav. STAT. § 613.250 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-79 (1959); N.D. REV. CODE § 34CODE ANN. §
ANN. § 736A

0114 (Supp. 1957); S.C. CODE § 40-46 (Supp. 1959); S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (Supp. 1952);
(1955); Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. art. 5154(g) (Supp. 1959); UTAH
1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-69 (1953).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-208
CODE ANN. § 34-16-4 (Supp.

34 Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957).
35 A "one owner" clause provides that not more than one working owner can perform
work within the jurisdiction of the union. All other working owners, ifany, must be employed

under terms of the working agreement. Id. at 766.
36 Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 159 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. App. 1959).

37 "Indiana, Arizona, Nevada and North Dakota do not have specific provisions against
the payment of fees or charges to a labor organization, although the Right to Work statutes
specifically outlaw agreements conditioning employment upon membership in a union." Id at

413-14.
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sidered the question have been discovered, although the attorney generals of
several states, anticipating
the problem, have gone on record as either approving
38
or condemning the plan.

The Problem
Having considered, therefore, legislative, judicial, and administrative interpretations of the Taft-Hartley Act with regard to the permissible forms of union
security, and having surveyed the existing state law on the subject, the status of
the agency shop in right-to-work states is still undetermined. In its simplest form,
the question is not whether the states have proscribed this kind of agreement, but
rather whether they can. This legislation, at least where it is applicable to interstate commerce, derives its authority from 14(b). However, as was indicated
above, the legislative history of this section bears no evidence that Congress was
thinking in terms of anything but compulsory membership, the words in fact used
by Congress in this authorization. And, as was stated, Congress was aware that
an agency shop could be, and had been, implemented as a substitute for compulsory membership in a jurisdiction where the latter was considered undesirable.
If it can be said with accuracy, then, that Congress did not expressly include
the power to prohibit support payments within the authorization of 14(b), should,
nevertheless, this authorization be inferred?
The question invites contradictory answers. On the one hand, the right to
work is indeed a hollow right if it is one that must be paid for, especially where
the purpose of the recipient of such a payment may not commend itself to him
who is compelled to pay. But the argument as to compulsory representation of
all the employees in the unit by the majority representative-to the exclusion of
all other agents-would seem to be well settled in favor of the majority representative.3 9 On the other hand, the representing union must by law represent all
the employees in the unit, regardless of whether or not they are at the same time
members of the union, and whether or not they pay their share of the cost. 40 The

free rider argument has received both Congressional4' and judicial support, 42 and
there is little indication that the Supreme Court would approve an extension of
14(b) to proscribe a principle that has commended itself to the Court in such
terms as

Thus Congress recognized the validity of the unions' concern about "free
riders" . . . and gave unions the power to contract to meet that problem
while withholding from
43 unions the power to cause the discharge of employees
for any other reason.
Beyond considerations of purpose, however, is the question alluded to previously-that of federal pre-emption. Since the Guss" and the Garmon45 decisions,
it seems clear that the Court will not sanction state action in labor disputes that
affect commerce and are potentially within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board. 46 Where state action pursuant to a right-to-work statute has
been approved by the Court, the disputes involved have been local in nature, and
38 Approving: Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Nev.) No. 184 July 11, 1952. Condemning: OPs. ATTY
(N.C.) June 13, 1952.
39 See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944);
J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 678 (1944).
40 Cf., Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
41 See, e.g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4887 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
42 See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480 (1957); Railway Employees
Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954);
Union Starch and Refining Co., 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 815
(1951).
43 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
44 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
45 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
46 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Local 429,
GEN.
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the question put to the Court one of the abrogation of free speech, the Algoma
case notwithstanding. In that case, it should be remembered, the state had premaintenance of a union security
scribed conditions requisite to the adoption and 47
agreement, and not the form of the security itself.
Whether or not the amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act contained in the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act48 will alter this situation remains
to be seen. Section 701 of the new Act allows the states to assert jurisdiction over
those cases which the Board refuses to hear. 49 It must be emphasized here, though,
that Section 701 cannot extend authority which Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley
Act did not cede, namely, the power to regulate anything more or less than the
degree of permissible compulsory union membership. And it can be argued that
where the purpose of federal labor legislation is to establish and to maintain a
uniform national labor policy, the effect of such a delegation of authority to the
states could result in as many different policies as there are states, the applicability of such policies being dependent, in areas affecting commerce, solely upon a
determination of jurisdiction by the Board. When this consideration reaches the
Court, as it appears destined to do, the Court may also be called upon finally to
decide the question of whether or not the Board can so limit its jurisdiction where
commerce is affected.
Conclusion and submissions
In analyzing the status of the agency shop, one cannot be unaware of a fundamental problem referred to above - of what meaning is a legislatively-protected
right to work if that right must be contingent upon a payment to an organization
whose activities and expenditures may range far beyond simple representation in
the collective bargaining process. 50 This enigma may in some respects be more
theoretical than real. The union must still be selected by a majority of the affected employees, 5' and if it does not perform its functions satisfactorily, it can be
decertified 52 and removed. And it should be noted that the provision in the TaftHartley Act, as originally enacted, requiring three-fourths approval by the affected
employees of a union security contract was repealed in 1951 because the vast majority of these referendums had been decided in favor of compulsory unionism.
In summary, then, it is submitted that an analysis of the validity of the agency
shop agreement in right-to-work states results in the following conclusions:
1. The policy underlying Section 8(a) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, as evidenced
both by its legislative history and subsequent interpretations by the courts and
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957);
Teamsters Union v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957); Weber v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
47 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301
(1949).
48 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
49 Section 701 amends § 14 of the Taft-Hartley Act to read in the part pertinent here:
14(c) (2) "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency
or the courts of any State... from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over
labor disputes over which the Board declines ... to assert jurisdiction."
50 See generally 105 CONG. REc. 16416 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959). The Supreme Court
may soon settle the question of whether or not political expenditures by a labor organization are
a legitimate exercise of the rights of a union as a bargaining agent in International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, probable jurisdictionnoted, 361 U.S. 807 (Oct. 12, 1959). Earlier opinion by Supreme Court of Georgia sub nom. Looper v. Georgia So. & Gla. Ry., 213 Ga. 279,

99 S.E.2d 101 (1957).

51 LABoR MANAGEMENT
§ 159(2) (1952).
52 LABoR MANAGEMENT
§ 159(c) (1) (A) (ii) (1952).

RELATIONS ACT

(Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat. 36 (1947), 29 U.S.C.

RELATioNS ACT

(Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
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by the National Labor Relations Board, was to establish a uniform degree of
permissible union security. But employment may not be conditioned upon
membership in a labor organization if such membership is denied for any
reason other than a failure to tender dues and initiation fees. Thus it is the
payment or at least tender of the costs of representation, and not membership
per se, upon which employment may be conditioned. It is compulsory unionism,
so qualified, that constitutes the Federal policy.
2. There is neither legislative nor judicial authority for extending the language of
Section 14(b) beyond its literal meaning. Such an extension would effect not
only a contravention of the expressed congressional purpose of establishing a
uniform policy for labor relations affecting commerce, but also would be an
obvious contradiction of the language and intent of Section 8(a) (3), and of
the expressed distinction on the latter section between membership and payment of representation costs.
3. Concerning labor relations not affecting commerce, states may set their own
policies, restricted only by the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Where interstate commerce is affected and the dispute is one within the potential jurisdiction of the NLRB, federal policy must prevail.
Although the effect of Section 701 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act is as yet undetermined, it is safe to assume that the states still have
no more authority in the matter of regulating collective bargaining agreements
affecting commerce than was originally ceded by 14(b)-to determine for themselves the permissible forms of compulsory union membership to be tolerated in
their own jurisdictions.
Although the purpose of this Note has not been to suggest a policy, but rather
to analyze a problem, reference to policy is unavoidable. Both the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts reflect a congressional consideration and determination of a
policy committed to the principle that collective bargaining, engaged in by parties
of at least potentially equal strength, is necessary to a sound economy in our present
society. Right-to-work legislation, however, represents a concern with the rights
of individuals to choose-without having their employment be contingent upon
the choice-whether or not to ally their own interests with those of their fellow
employees in an organized society acting as their representative. Whereas compulsion by the will of the majority in this matter of choice is approved and fostered
as a means necessary to the achievement of the end desired under one approach,
such compulsion is rejected and specifically prohibited by those whose efforts and
aspirations are directed toward the implementation of a different policy to realize
a different end.
Whether or not the motivation behind the right-to-work movement is a sincere
and truly democratic one is immaterial in this context, though, because the conflict
between these contradictory policies has already produced an ignominious and
anomalous result-the agency shop. A uniform national policy cannot remain if
states are allowed to substitute their own judgments in matters deemed to require
an identity of treatment. But a right to work is indeed a right in name only if it
must be purchased from the organization against whose domination that right was
intended to be freely exercised.
And thus, it is submitted, the agency shop is an enigma that ought not be permitted to endure. The question to be determined is not so much one of the particular means employed, however, as it is of the end to be achieved. Since federal
pre-emption is too well settled to contest in those matters deemed by Congress to
be of national concern and requiring national regulation, the policy must rest with
Congress. There must be either a reaffirmation of the purposes of existent federal
legislation, or a recognition at the national level that the changed conditionis of
labor and management and the needs of the individual employee demand a different national commitment.
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To resolve the validity of the agency shop is, in reality, to choose between these
conflicting principles of labor-management relations. Such a choice is most properly that of Congress, rather than of the courts or state legislatures. The enigma
would seem destined to remain, however, until Congress makes that choice.
J. Michael Guenther

